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Recent Developments
PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATIONS
AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT

n Thomas v. State, 301 Md.
294, 483 A.2d 6 (1984), the
Court of Appeals of Maryland
held that a post-trial psychiatric
evaluation for purposes of a sentencing
determination is not violative of the
sixth amendment's guarantee of
assistance of counsel solely because the
defendant's counsel had consented to
the evaluation without knowledge of the
fact that it was performed by an expert
paid by the prosecution. Prior to this
decision, it appeared that the doctrine
promulgated in Estelle v. Smith, 451 u.s.
454 (1981), would have prohibited
such an evaluation based on sixth
amendment grounds.
In Thomas, the defendant, Donald
Thomas, was found guilty of two counts
of first degree murder, rape, two first
degree sexual offenses and robbery in
the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.
On petition by the State, the court
ordered a pre-sentence psychiatric
examination to evaluate the defendant
on issues concerning the imposition of
the death penalty. A psychiatrist from
the Clifton T. Perkins State Hospital was
chosen to evaluate the defendant. This
same psychiatrist had previously
evaluated the defendant on two
occasions. Although the defendant's
counsel consented to the post-trial
sentence evaluation, he claimed at the
sentencing hearing that the defendant
was denied the assistance of counsel
under the sixth amendment at this
evaluation because his consent was
based on the belief that the psychiatrist
was only a staff member of Clifton T.
Perkins, as he had been in the previous
evaluations, and not the prosecution's
paid expert. The defendant's counsel
further stated that if he had known of
this fact he would not have allowed the
examination. The circuit court denied

I

Right to
counsel
undermined.

defendant's objection and allowed the
admission of the psychiatrist's report
and testimony. The sentencing hearing
resulted in the imposition of the death
penalty for one of the counts of murder,
a life sentence for the other count of
murder, concurrent terms of life
imprisonment for the rape and first
degree sexual offenses, and a twenty year
consecutive sentence for the armed
robbery. In the present case, the Court
of Appeals of Maryland upheld the
lower court's ruling.
The court in Thomas began by
discussing Estelle v. Smith, the governing
case in this area. In Estelle, the trial judge,
sua sponte and without consent of the
defendant's counsel, ordered a pre-trial
psychiatric examination of the
defendant to determine his competency
to stand trial. At the sentencing hearing,
the psychiatrist testified, based on this
examination, that the defendant would
be dangerous in the future, an element
necessary to impose the death penalty.
The United States Supreme Court,
overturning the lower court's ruling,
concluded that the defendant "was
denied the assistance of his attorneys in
making the significant decision of
whether to submit to the examination
and to what end the psychiatrist's
findings could be employed." Estelle,
451 U.S. at 471.
The Thomas court, however, reasoned
that Estelle did not apply. First,
Maryland does not bear the burden of
proof in showing future dangerousness
as did the Texas statute involved in
Estelle. Second, the defendant was

informed by the psychiatrist in the first
pre-trial evaluation that "any
information which he revealed to the
psychiatrist would not be held in
confidence but could be used at a
subsequent capital sentencing hearing."
301 Md. at 328, 483 A.2d at 24. Third,
unlike in Estelle, the defendant's lawyer
in Thomas "had prior notice of both
examinations by ... [ the psychiatrist]
and had the opportunity to confer with
[ the defendant] before each
examination." 301 Md. at 328, 483
A.2d at 24. Fourth, the defendant in
Thomas, unlike in Estelle, was given
Miranda-type warnings prior to his initial
examination. Finally, the defendant's
counsel was informed prior to the
evaluation that "the post-trial
examination by ... [the psychiatrist] W:,lS
intended to develop material for
presentation at the sentencing hearing."
301 Md. at 328, 483 A.2d at 24. The
court reasoned that, in light of these
circumstances, it was unimportant that
the defendant's counsel "was honestly
mistaken in the belief that ... [the
psychiatrist] would evaluate the '"
[defendant] in his capacity as a Perkins
psychiatrist [because] that fact alone
would not require reversal under the
principles of Estelle." 301 Md. at 329,
483 A.2d at 24. Therefore, the court
concluded that the defendant's sixth
amendment right to assistance of
counsel was not violated in this case.
Judge Eldridge dissented on the sixth
amendment issue in Thomas, arguing
that Estelle did apply because "the
defendant Thomas was obviously
denied the assistance of counsel in
making the decision of whether to
submit to
[the psychiatrist's]
examination in connection with the
sentencing proceeding." 301 Md. at350,
483 A.2d at 35 (Eldridge, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Although
the defendant's counsel did consent to
this post-trial evaluation, the consent,
Judge Eldridge reasoned, was "induced
by the prosecution's deception." 301
Md. at 350, 483 A.2d at 35 (Eldridge, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in
part). A consent that is "induced by
misrepresentation is not consent." 301
Md. at 350,483 A.2dat35 (Eldridge,J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The misrepresentation in Thomas
was that the defendant's counsel
believed that the psychiatrist that
evaluated the defendant was a neutral
expert from Clifton T. Perkins and not
the prosecution's paid expert.
The dissenter then dissected the
.majority's reasoning. He stated that the
burden of proof differences between
.Thomas and Estelle, as well as the
psychiatrist's warnings to the defendant
that any information which he revealed
could be used at a subsequent capital
sentencing hearing, were "utterly
irrelevant to the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel issue." 301 Md. at 352, 483
A.2d at 36 (Eldridge, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
Furthermore, Judge Eldridge argued that
although the defendant's counsel
consented to the psychiatrist's
examination, as in Estelle, his consent
was based on a misrepresentation by the
prosecution concerning the neutrality of
the psychiatrist. Therefore, citing Estelle
as controlling, the dissenter concluded
that "[b ]ecause of the prosecution's
misleading action in this case, the
defendant Thomas was deprived of the
assistance of counsel in deciding
whether or not to submit to ... [the
psychiatrist's] examination in
connection with the capital sentencing
hearing." 3D1 Md. at 352,483 A.2d at
36 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
The Thomas court appears to have
restricted the defendant's right to
assistance of counsel under the sixth
amendment. By allowing the post-trial
psychiatric examination of the
defendant for a determination on the
imposition of the death penalty without
the knowledgeable consent of the
defendant's counsel, it has gutted the
sixth amendment's protections
promulgated in Estelle. The court is
opening the door for the prosecution's
use of trickery and misrepresentation in
order to gain a defendant's counsel's
consent and to deny a defendant the
assistance of counsel guaranteed him
under the sixth amendment. Without
such assistance of counsel, poorly
educated and fearful defendants will be
wittingly or unwittingly denied the full
protection of the law by the
prosecution.
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DOCKWORKER'S REMEDY

Travelers Insurance Co., 370 U.S. 114,

he issue of whether a
dockworker's exclusive remedy
for an occupational injury is
under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act ("Act" or
"LHWCA"), 33 U.S.c. §901 et seq.,
where a portion of the injury preceded
the Act's coverage, was subject to review
by the Maryland Court of Appeals
during its September, 1984 term. A
decision in Stanley v. Western Maryland
Railway Company, 301 Md. 204 482
A.2d881 (1984), was reached on October
24, 1984 and is one which will have
substantial impact in the area of
workers' compensation benefits. In
order to understand the ramifications of
Stanley, however, one must first have a
basic understanding of the principles
underlying the system of workers'
compensation.
Benefits for employees injured while
on the job were first a product of state
common law and statutes. Although the
fifty states vary greatly as to the
substantive legal principles which guide
particular workers' compensation
schemes, all systems share the same
underlying principles: to compensate an
employee as quickly and efficiently as
possible for work-related injuries,
regardless of an employee's
contributory negligence, and to limit the
ultimate liability of the employer for any
such injuries.
Prior to 1927, there was not a
uniform scheme of compensation law
applied by the states to Injuries
sustained by maritime workers.
Congress, therefore, saw the need for a
uniform federal system and the
LHWCA "was designed to ensure that a
compensation remedy existed for all
injuries sustained by employees on
navigable waters and to avoid
uncertainty as to the source, state or
federal, of that remedy." Calbeck v.

124 (1962).
Apparently, this federal system of
workers' compensation benefits for
,maritime employees provided sufficient
benefits to injured workers for a number
of years. However, a problem arose in
that a maritime employee was only
covered under the Act for certain
activities (usually only those performed
on navigable waters) and would not, in a
maj ori ty of cases, receive any
compensation benefits under LHWCA
for injuries sustained on land. Congress
amended the Act in 1972 "to extend
coverage to additional workers in an
attempt to avoid anomalies inherent in a
system that drew lines at the water's edge
by allowing compensation under the Act
only to workers injured on the seaward
side of a pier." Northeast Marine
Terminal Co., Inc. v. Caputo, 432 U.S.
249 (1977).
In the instant case, James Stanley had
been an employee of the Western
Maryland Railway Company since
1942. In approximately 1955 or 1956
Stanley was assigned to operate a crane
used to unload cargo from ships. The
crane was extremely noisy and caused a
gradual auditory impairment in
Stanley'S ears. He first became aware of
his permanent hearing loss in 1977 and,
in 1979, filed a negligence action against
his employer under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45
U.S.c. §51 et seq.
The Federal Employers' Liability Act,
enacted by Congress in 1908, permitted
a claimant to sue the railroad company,
his employer, for injuries resulting from
the company's negligence. Stanley
contended that the majority of his long
term exposure occurred prior to 1972,
at a time when he, as a dockworker, was
not covered by the LHWCA. Stanley,
therefore, sought to apportion his
hearing loss claim between the two
distinct Acts, FELA and LHWCA. In
apportioning his disability between the
two Acts, however, Stanley made a
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